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Abstract 
This paper develops a multilateral decomposition procedure for the analysis of wage differentials 
and applies this to the evolution of the racial wage hierarchy in South Africa over the period 1993 
to 1999 amongst full-time regular employees of normal working age, but excluding those in the 
primary sector and the defence forces.  We find that the transition to democratic rule in 1994 was 
accompanied by an improvement in the wage position of the majority African workforce relative to 
all other racial groups, but that these gains were not fully preserved through the latter half of the 
decade.  The persistence of racial wage differences following the repeal of all overt discriminatory 
laws and regulations points to the need for concerted policy interventions to reverse the legacy of 
apartheid.  We review the range of policy initiatives that have been taken by the South African 
Government since 1994 in the light of our empirical findings. 
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1.  Introduction 
The gradual erosion and final collapse of the apartheid regime has stimulated a large and still 
growing literature on the effects of racial discrimination on the labour market of the Republic of 
South Africa [see, for example, Human and Greenacre, (1987), Knight and McGrath (1987), 
Moll (1992, 1995), Treiman et al (1996) and Sherer (2000), Allanson et al. (2000, 2002)].  The 
particular contribution of this paper is twofold.  First we contribute to the literature on the 
measurement of wage discrimination by further developing a multilateral procedure, originally 
introduced in Allanson et al. (2000), that provides an exact, joint decomposition of a set of wage 
differentials into explained and unexplained components.  Second, we use this methodology to 
provide some of the first, detailed evidence concerning the evolution of the racial wage hierarchy 
in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The starting point for our study is the simple observation that South Africa is a 
multiracial society: the system of apartheid laws recognised four main racial groups, namely 
blacks, coloureds, asians and whites.  The existence of more than two distinct groups raises a 
general methodological issue of how to analyse the resultant set of wage differentials.  The 
common solution to this problem has been to separately decompose the wage differential 
between one or more pairings of the groups using standard Oaxaca-Blinder techniques.  But if 
the aim is to provide an exhaustive analysis of the complete set of wage differentials then this 
pair-wise approach is cumbersome and the results difficult to interpret in the absence of a 
common specification of the non-discriminatory wage structure.  As an alternative, Allanson et 
al. (2000) propose a multilateral procedure that provides an exact, joint decomposition of the 
pattern of logarithmic wage differentials between the various groups into explained and residual 
components.  In this paper, we further develop their procedure so as to express all the 
decomposition results in terms of levels of and changes in percentage deviations from the 
geometric mean wage of either the relevant group or the whole workforce under the hypothesised 
non-discriminatory wage structure.  The interpretation of the resultant findings is particularly 
intuitive with a clear identification of the various sources of wage disparities.  
The South African apartheid system formally ended with the election of the African 
National Congress at the first all-race elections held in 1994.  These elections concluded 46 years 
of official racial discrimination and inequality that had its roots in social structures, practices and 
attitudes dating back to the early nineteenth century.  Despite the political transformation that has 
occurred and the elimination of overtly discriminatory laws and regulations, ‘the overall 
consequences of the legacy of apartheid are deeply embedded in the polity, society and economy 
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of the country’ (Presidential Commission, 1996) potentially undermining the aspirations of the 
new South African democracy, at least within a reasonable time-frame.   
Discrimination in the labour market was at the heart of the apartheid system, resulting in 
the use of non-productivity-related criteria in decisions concerning the allocation and utilisation 
of labour such as in recruitment, remuneration, firing and retrenchment (Presidential 
Commission, 1996).  Apartheid policies adopted by the White-dominated National Party 
government such as colour barring and job reservation, for example through the Industrial 
Conciliation Act 1956, constituted statutory forms of racial discrimination and have now been 
repealed.  Labour market outcomes were also conditioned by various institutional barriers to 
labour mobility and through the differential provision of and access to education, training and 
social welfare.  These forms of extra-market discrimination1 have also been subject to 
fundamental reform with, for example, the repeal of the Bantu Urban Areas Act 1945 and the 
Bantu Education Act 1955.  
However the replacement of apartheid legislation by policies designed to tackle the 
perceived causes of racial wage inequality has not as yet proved sufficient to eradicate the 
established racial wage hierarchy.  Figure 1 provides prima facie evidence of the persistence of 
South Africa’s well-known hierarchical wage structure over the period 1993 to 1999. It shows 
that amongst full-time, regular, civilian, non-primary sector, male employees of normal working 
age, Whites had the highest geometric mean wage, followed by Indians/Asians, Coloureds and 
finally Africans/Blacks who received the lowest geometric mean wage of any racial group 
throughout the period.  Between 1993 and 1995 the overall African-White wage differential fell 
but then this gap stagnated or even rose slightly through the latter half of the 1990s.  Thus 
substantial wage disparities persist five years after the transition to majority democratic rule. 
A useful parallel may be drawn here with USA and other international experience even 
though this tends to concern discrimination against a minority, rather than the majority as is the 
case in South Africa.  In particular, Darity and Mason (1998) and Altonji and Blank (1999) 
review a large literature on the USA labour market which provides evidence that the signal Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 led to a sustained and significant decline in Black/White earnings 
differentials over the following decade (Donahue and Heckman, 1991), but that substantial 
racial disparities remained which have proved remarkably persistent over time.  One possible 
explanation is put forward by Arrow (1998) who stresses the potential importance both of 
                                                 
1   Extra-market discrimination refers to structural and systemic factors that exist prior to the labour market which 
condition the supply of and demand for labour (Presidential Commission, 1996). 
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Figure 1.  Geometric mean wages by race as a percentage of the overall 
geometric mean wage, 1993-99
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 ‘statistical discrimination’ and of social interactions and networks in influencing behaviour and 
perpetuating differential treatment.  Thus the apartheid policy of residential segregation might 
be expected to have a long-term detrimental impact on the operation of the labour market by 
inhibiting the formation of a genuinely multiracial society.  A second reason may be that 
previous extra-market discrimination, particularly in the provision of education, can contribute 
markedly to continuing inequalities in the labour market since disadvantage tends to be self-
reproducing and reinforcing.  Case and Deaton (1999) find that the educational attainment of 
African children in South Africa is positively related to both the level of education of the head 
of the household and the level of household resources.  Finally, Juhn et al. (1991, 1993) 
emphasise the importance of also taking changing returns to skills into account if the 
distribution of those skills is not uniform across racial groups due to either current 
discrimination or enduring patterns of disadvantage.  In this paper we focus on the extent to 
which such broader changes in the overall distribution of wages may serve to explain the lack of 
any sustained convergence in racial wage disparities in the post-apartheid era.   
Poswell (2002) argues that the South African economy is characterised by a large excess 
labour supply and subject to increasing trade liberalisation and globalisation, both of which are 
likely to have put downward pressure on wages.  On the other hand, skill shortages have put 
upward pressure on the top end of the wage distribution while trade union power may have been 
effective in maintaining wage levels in some lower paid jobs (see also Natrass, 2000).  Figure 2 
shows that overall wage inequality amongst full-time, regular, civilian, non-primary sector, male 
employees of normal working age, as measured by the logarithm of the ratio of the hourly wage 
rate of the 90th percentile worker to that of the 10th percentile worker, fell between 1993 and 
1995 but then grew steadily throughout the latter half of the decade.  Between 1995 and 1999 
there was a 17% increase in the 90-10 log wage differential as the net result of a 22% rise in the 
90-50 differential and a 12% rise in the 50-10 differential.  Given that Africans are relatively 
concentrated in the lower half of the skills distribution, we conjecture that rising skill prices may 
provide some part of the explanation for the persistence of racial wage disparities. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The following section sets out the multilateral 
decomposition procedure that we employ to investigate the changing basis of the racial wage 
hierarchy.  Section 3 describes the data from the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards 
and Development survey and the 1995 to 1999 October Household Surveys that we employ in 
our analysis.  Section 4 presents our results on the nature and sources of the evolution of the 
racial wage hierarchy in the post-apartheid era.  In the light of these empirical findings, the final 
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section reviews the range of policy initiatives that have been taken by the South African 
Government to tackle the legacy of apartheid in the labour market.  
 
2.  Methodological Framework 
This section presents a multilateral procedure that facilitates investigation of the changing basis 
of the racial wage hierarchy within South Africa by providing a joint decomposition of the 
logarithmic wage differentials between African, Coloured, Indian and White groups.  Like other 
decomposition techniques our methodology measures discrimination indirectly as the residual 
component from an estimated wage function.  Changes in this residual component over time 
should reflect any variation in the extent of wage discrimination but may also arise from changes 
in unmeasured or unobserved characteristics of the workforce and changes in the returns to such 
characteristics.  We adapt an approach due to Juhn et al. (1991) to seek to identify the potential 
importance of changes in the returns to unobserved characteristics in the evolution of the residual 
wage gap. 
Multilateral decomposition procedure 
Following Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), the gross difference between the mean 
logarithm of wages of racial groups p and q (p, q∈ r=African, Coloured, Indian, White) in 
period t can be decomposed into an explained or predicted difference due to disparities in 
observed or measured characteristics between the two groups, and an unexplained or residual 
difference attributable to both wage discrimination and unmeasured disparities in characteristics.  
Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) formalise this basic decomposition procedure 
by explicitly writing the residual difference in terms of the wage that each group receives relative 
to that which it would receive in the absence of discrimination.  In Allanson et al. (2000), we 
further partition both the gross and predicted differences in the mean logarithm of wages, to yield 
the following total decomposition of )W/Wln( qtpt : 
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where rtW  and tW  are respectively the geometric mean wages of group r and the entire 
workforce under the (observed) discriminatory wage structure, and *rtW  and 
*
tW  are the 
corresponding geometric mean wages under the (hypothetical) non-discriminatory wage 
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structure.  The main advantage of (1) over the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is that 
each component of the equation is expressed as the difference between two terms that is each 
defined independently of the particular binary comparison that is being made.  
The implementation of (1) first requires the specification and estimation of a suitable 
model of wage determination under both the discriminatory and non-discriminatory regimes.  Let 
the observed wage of an individual worker h in group r in year t be given by a standard 
Mincerian wage function: 
rhtrtrhtrht uXwln +′= β ;     h=1,…nrt ; ∀r (2) 
where rhtw  is the wage of the worker, rhtX  is a vector of observed characteristics associated with 
the worker, rtβ  is a conformable vector of group-specific returns to characteristics and rhtu  is 
defined so that E( rhtu | rhtX ) = 0.  If data on wages consist solely of point observations then 
estimation of (2) by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the sample of nrt observations on group r 
workers yields an estimate rtβˆ  such that rtrtrt ˆXWln β′=  where rtX  is the vector of mean values 
of the observed characteristics of group r.  Additionally, OLS estimation of (2) over the pooled 
sample of size nt = Σnrt yields the pooled estimate tβˆ  such that ttt ˆXWln β′=  where tX  is the 
vector of mean values of the observed characteristics of the entire workforce.   
 The appropriate specification for the non-discriminatory wage structure is less well 
established in the literature.2  We make the strong but conventional assumption that the supply of 
labour is fixed such that neither the number, identities nor characteristics of workers would 
change in the absence of discrimination. We further assume that the form of the wage function 
would be unchanged and specify the non-discriminatory wage function for an individual worker i 
of any race in year t as:  
;uXwln *it
*
tit
*
it +′= β      i=1,… nt;      nt =Σ nrt; (3) 
where *itw  is the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage of the worker, itX  is a vector of observed 
characteristics associated with the worker, *tβ  is a conformable vector of non-discriminatory 
returns to characteristics and *itu  is defined so that E(
*
itu | itX ) = 0.  Neumark (1988) provides a 
theoretical model to support the choice of *tβˆ = tβˆ , that is the estimate of the non-discriminatory 
                                                 
2   Allanson et al. (2000) examine the sensitivity of the results of the multilateral decomposition procedure to the 
choice of estimator for the non-discriminatory wage structure. 
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wage structure *tβ  in (3) is obtained by the estimation of (2) over the pooled sample of observations 
generated by the discriminatory wage regime.  Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) show that *tβˆ  can be 
interpreted as a weighted combination of the rtβˆ  estimates in (2), though individual elements of 
*
tβˆ  need not be bracketed by the corresponding elements of rtβˆ  from the separately estimated 
racial wage structures.  The crucial point however for our multilateral decomposition procedure 
is simply that if t
*
t
ˆˆ ββ =  then ttt*t ˆXWlnWˆln β′== , that is our estimates of the overall 
geometric mean wage are identical under the two labour market regimes.  
 In practice, OLS estimation of (2) will be infeasible if all or some of the observations on 
wages take the form of interval data as will be the case if workers were not asked to report their 
exact wage but only within which of a set of pre-defined wage brackets the amount fell or if 
some workers were only prepared to respond in this manner.  In general, the use of a generalised 
Tobit estimator (StataCorp, 1997, Volume 1, p. 145) will serve to deal with any censoring of the 
dependent variable while yielding identical results to the OLS estimator in the special case in 
which all observations on wages are reported as exact amounts.  We define rtrt
~
rt
~XWln β′= , 
ttt
~ ~XWln β′=  and tt*tt
~
*
t
~X~XWln ββ ′=′=  where tildas refer to the generalised Tobit estimates, 
such that 
~
rtWln  and 
~
tWln  are unbiased but not necessarily exact estimators of rtWln  and tWln . 
 We proceed to obtain estimates of the various terms in the decomposition equation (1) as:  
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where )1~ln{ +rtγ  will exactly equal the sum of )1
~ln{ +rtθ  and )1
~ln{ +rtδ  since *tW
~ln  is equal to 
~
tWln  by construction.  The gross wage differentials rtγ~ , predicted wage differentials rtθ
~  and 
unadjusted residual wage differentials or Beckerian ‘discrimination coefficients’ rtδ
~  constitute a 
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set of sufficient statistics for the multilateral analysis of the racial wage hierarchy.  Moreover, if 
all wage gaps are expressed relative to the (common) overall geometric wage then the gross 
wage differential rtγ~  will be equal to the sum of the predicted wage differential rtθ
~  and the 
adjusted residual wage differential )1~(~ +rtrt θδ :  
*
*
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
**
~
~~
~
~~
~
~
~
~~
~
~~
)1~(~~~
~~
~
t
rtrt
t
trt
t
rt
rt
rtrt
t
trt
rtrtrt
t
trt
rt W
WW
W
WW
W
W
W
WW
W
WW
W
WW −
+
−
=







−
+
−
=++=
−
= θδθγ ; ∀r    (7) 
This makes the interpretation of the results particularly clear and intuitive.  
Decomposition of changes in racial wage differentials over time 
The decomposition of changes in racial wage differentials over time is complicated by the 
possibility that changes in the residual wage gap can result either from changes in wage 
discrimination or from changes in the distribution of and returns to unmeasured or unobserved 
characteristics in the workforce or from some combination of the two.  The standard 
methodology for decomposing wage changes between groups over time (Altonji and Blank, 
1999) is based on the assumption that any change in the residual wage gap is due to changes in 
wage discrimination and thus attributes the whole of the change in wage differentials to changes 
in observed characteristics and the returns to those characteristics.  In the case of our multilateral 
procedure, this assumption yields the following decompositions of the changes in the gross, 
predicted and unadjusted residual wage differentials for each group r between years t and t':  
( ) ( ))1~(~)1~(~ ~~~~ '''' +−++−=− rtrtrtrtrtrtrtrt θδθδθθγγ ; ∀r  (8) 
( ) ( ))~exp()~exp()~exp()~exp(~~ *'*''**'' trttrttrttrtrtrt XXXX ββββθθ ′∆−′∆+′∆−′∆=− ; ∀r (9) 
and: 
( ) ( ))~exp()~exp()~exp()~exp( ~~ ''''' rtrtrtrtrtrtrtrtrtrt XXXX ββββδδ ∆′−∆′+∆′−∆′=− ; ∀r (10) 
where srsrs XXX −=∆  (s∈ t, t') is the difference in observed characteristics between the 
average group r and overall average worker and *srsrs
~~~ βββ∆ −=  (s∈ t, t')3 is the difference 
                                                 
3 If an element of rs
~β∆ is defined in period t but not in t' then we assume that rt'rt ~~ β∆β∆ = , i.e. the difference 
between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory returns to the characteristic is the same in the two periods.  By 
construction, if an element of rs
~β∆ is not defined then the value of the corresponding element of rsX will be zero. 
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between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory returns to observed characteristics faced by 
group r workers.  Hence that part of the change in the gross wage differential predicted by the 
model of wage determination is given in (9) as the sum of the effects of the change in the 
difference in observed characteristics given the non-discriminatory wage structure in year t and 
the change in the non-discriminatory returns to observed characteristics given the difference in 
observed characteristics in year t'.  Whereas the change in the ‘discrimination coefficient’ in (10) 
is equal to the sum of the effects of the change in the difference in returns to observed 
characteristics given the average characteristics of group r workers in year t and the change in 
the observed characteristics of the average group r worker given the difference in returns to 
observed characteristics in year t'. 
 However, Juhn et al. (1991) argue that the standard approach may give a misleading 
impression of the change in wage discrimination over the period since part of the change in the 
residual component may be due to changes either in the racial distribution of unobserved 
characteristics within the workforce or in the returns to those characteristics.  In particular, if 
returns to unobserved characteristics increase then this will lead to apparent increases in 
discrimination against those groups over-represented in the lower end of the residual wage 
distribution due to inferior unobserved characteristics and in favour of those groups with superior 
unobserved characteristics.  To seek to isolate the potential size of any such effect, Juhn et al. 
(1991) devise a decomposition procedure based on the assumption that the residual component is 
entirely due to differences in unobserved characteristics.  This assumption may not be that 
implausible in the South African context: Van der Berg (2001) argues that if account were taken 
in earning functions of the large variations in educational quality then the residual role for labour 
market race discrimination in explaining earnings differential might well be small.   
We are unable to substantiate this contention with the data available to us on educational 
provision by race (see footnote 17).  However we do construct an alternative decomposition of 
the change in the unadjusted residual wage differential in (10) that provides a measure which 
may be interpreted as the change in returns to unobserved characteristics if residual wage 
differences are entirely due to disparities in unobserved characteristics and the overall 
distribution of such characteristics is constant over time.  If these conditions were to hold then 
the model of wage determination would be given by (3) and, following Juhn et al. (1991), we can 
write tititu σε=  where itε is a 'standardised' disturbance term (with a mean of zero and a 
variance of one) that may be interpreted as a measure of unobserved characteristics and the 
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residual standard deviation of wages tσ  is interpreted as the return to those characteristics in 
year t.  Using this notation (4) may be re-written as: 
trtttrtttrtttrttrtrtt XXXXWW σεβσεεβγ ~~~)(~)~~(~)(lnln)1ln{ ***
~~~
∆+′−′=−+′−′=−=+ ;  ∀r  (11) 
where the first equality holds by assumption, rt~ε  and t~ε  are respectively the group r and overall 
average standardised regression residuals from the pooled regression (3), and rtrt εε
~~
=∆  since 
t
~ε =0 by construction.  Accordingly, the change in the unadjusted residual wage differential can 
be re-written from (10) as:  
( ) ( ))~~exp()~~exp()~~exp()~~exp(~~ ''''' trttrttrttrtrtrt σεσεσεσεδδ ∆−∆+∆−∆=− ;∀r (12) 
where the decomposition parallels that of the change in the predicted wage differential in (9).  
Thus the change in the unadjusted residual wage differential is equal to the sum of the effects of 
the change in difference in unobserved characteristics given the returns to those characteristics in 
year t and the change in returns to unobserved characteristics given the difference in 
characteristics in year t'. Implementation of (12) first requires the imputation of residuals for 
those observations with interval wage data: we calculate a point estimate of the residual as the 
expected value of the residual conditional on the predicted wage for that observation.  
Computation of trtσε ~~  and '' ~~ trtσε  is then straightforward while trtσε ~~ '  may be calculated as the 
average of the group r residuals that would have been observed in year t if group r workers had 
held the same positions in the year t residual wage distribution that they had held in the year t' 
residual wage distribution.  The latter procedure suggests the alternative interpretation of (12) as 
the sum of the effects of the movement of group r workers within the overall distribution of 
unobserved characteristics holding the returns to those characteristics constant and the change in 
the returns to unobserved characteristics holding the distribution of group r workers within the 
overall distribution of unobserved characteristics constant.   
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3.  Data 
The data for the study are principally drawn from the October Household Surveys (OHSs) that 
were conducted annually by Statistics South Africa4 (various years) between 1993 and 1999.  
The OHSs are based on probability samples of large numbers of households (ranging from 
16000 to 30000) and cover a range of development indicators.  One of the main purposes of the 
OHSs is to obtain indicators of the size of the economically active population in South Africa 
with special reference to the number of unemployed persons.  Employees in all formal as well as 
informal business sectors are covered by the OHS since the survey is based on households, not 
businesses.  Prior to the introduction of the Labour Force Survey in January 2000, the OHS was 
the only source of official data on the hours and earnings of individual workers in South Africa. 
Successive OHSs were conducted as independent surveys and the resultant data sets are 
not completely comparable due to changes in target population, sample design and 
methodology, and questionnaire content and wording.  In particular, the 1993 OHS neither 
covered the whole of South Africa due to the exclusion of the former bantustan states of 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC states) nor collected sufficient information 
on employment to support the wage function analysis.  Nor does the 1994 OHS provide suitable 
data for comparison due to both limitations in the sampling method and differences in the way in 
which the pay/salary questions were asked.5  In place of these first two OHSs we use the Project 
for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) survey6 which was undertaken 
during the nine months leading up to the country's first democratic elections at the end of April 
1994 and provides data on the characteristics and employment conditions of individual workers 
drawn from a representative sample of nearly 9000 households7 covering the whole of South 
Africa.  The PSLSD was conducted by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research 
Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town with technical support from the World Bank 
(SALDRU, 1994).  
                                                 
4  Formerly the Central Statistical Service. 
5 The OHS has typically asked for information on total salary/pay before deductions.  But the 1994 OHS asked 
respondents for their total pay and then followed this up with questions on whether the stated amount was before or 
after deductions and, if and only if total pay before deductions had been reported, the amount of any such 
deductions.  As a result, gross pay data is only available for a sub-sample of workers which does not appear to be 
representative based on exploratory analysis of the data.  
6 To test the comparability of the data from the PSLSD survey with that from the 1993 OHS, we conducted a 
parallel decomposition analysis based on a common restricted sample definition and wage function specification.  
The two sets of results are broadly similar with the exception of Indians who appear to command a much lower 
geometric mean wage (and hence gross wage premium) from the PSLSD survey than from the 1993 OHS data.  
7 In the PSLSD, a household is defined as a single person or group of people who have lived together for at least 15 
days out of the past year, who eat together and who share resources. To ensure compatibility with the OHS, we 
further require that individuals were present for more than 15 of the last 30 days. 
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For our analysis of racial wage rate differentials we initially restricted the sample to men 
between the ages of 15 and 65 who were in full-time, regular employment8 in any economic 
activity other than agriculture forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, and the armed services.  
We excluded female, part-time and casual workers on the grounds that these categories of 
workers might face discrimination on the basis of gender and employment status, which could 
bias our estimates of the extent of racial wage discrimination.  The age restrictions limit the 
sample to adults not engaged in retirement occupations.  Workers in the agricultural sector are 
excluded due to inconsistencies in the enumeration of agricultural workers caused by changes in 
OHS sampling methodology (Statistics South Africa, 2000: iv), most notably in the identification 
procedure for non-urban areas between the 1995 and 1996 OHSs (Statistics South Africa, 1999).  
Workers in the mining industry are excluded since the sampling frames of the various OHSs did 
not adequately cover mining hostels prior to 1998.  Finally, South African Defence force 
members are excluded, as the 1995 OHS does not contain a detailed breakdown of military 
occupations. 
We further restricted the sample to those workers for which we could calculate reliable 
estimates of gross hourly wages and for which no data were missing on the common set of 
independent variables specified in the wage functions.  Information on pay or salary is reported 
only in exact terms in the PSLSD, only within pre-specified intervals in the (1993 and) 1996 
OHS and as a mixture of point and interval observations in all other OHSs.  Gross hourly wage 
rates were calculated from both the PSLSD and OHS data by converting all reported gross pay 
data to a weekly basis and dividing by hours worked in the past seven days.  Nevertheless, 
neither survey is ideally suited for this purpose because the information on hours worked relate 
to the total hours worked by an individual in all economic activities whereas the information on 
pay relates to total salary/pay (including overtime and bonus9 but before deductions) in main 
employment.  To ensure the reliability of our hourly wage rate estimates we therefore excluded 
those employees who either had not worked at least 35 hours in the past seven days,10 or could be 
identified as being engaged in economic activities other than their main job (either as 
                                                 
8 The PSLSD survey only distinguishes between regular and casual wage employment so full-time status is 
identified on the basis of hours worked in the past week (the regular wage employment category includes self-
employed professionals but these individuals can be excluded on the  basis of reported self-employment status).  
The 1995 and 1996 OHSs only distinguish between full-time and part-time employment whereas later OHSs also 
include casual employment as a separate category.  
9   The OHS questionnaires did not explicitly state that bonuses should be included in total pay prior to 1996.  The 
1999 OHS questionnaire further specifies that allowances should be included. 
10  The 1997 and subsequent OHSs further allow us to identify workers who worked a 'normal' week in the past 
seven days.  Limiting the sample to these workers does not appear to appreciably affect the results of the 
decomposition analysis. 
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employees11 or on own account12), or had reported earnings on a daily basis.  The surveys also 
provide comparable data on various worker and job attributes, including age, educational 
attainment, region of residence, occupation, industry and trade union membership, which are 
used to specify a common set of determinants of the wage function.   
Finally, we seek to clean the data of any outliers which may give rise to grossly 
influential observations. Of particular concern are apparent clerical errors in the data for some 
observations on wages and hours worked.  For example, in the 1999 OHS there are the cases of 
a African bricklayer and a White manager both in the construction industry who are respectively 
reported as earning R5 per month for a 45 hour week and R600035 per month for a 42 hour 
week.  Errors may also be present in the data on worker and employment characteristics but 
since these variables are either categorical or naturally bounded then normal checks for data 
consistency may be expected to clean the sample of such cases.   
Treating each data set separately as a simple random sample, we adopt a method for the 
identification of multiple outliers due to Hadi and Simonoff (1993) which is relatively resistant 
to both masking and swamping effects and does not require the number of potential outliers to 
be arbitrarily set in advance.  The first step is to establish a clean sub-set of size M by estimating 
the regression wage function (3) using the pooled sample of size n, sorting the observations in 
ascending order of the internally studentised residuals and then selecting the first M=s 
observations where s is the minimum number of observations in the ordered sequence necessary 
for identification of the model.13 For those observations with interval wage data, a point estimate 
of the residual is calculated as the expected value of the residual conditional on the predicted 
wage for that observation.  The next step increases the size of the clean sub-set by one: the 
regression model is re-estimated using the clean sub-set, the observations sorted in ascending 
order of the adjusted residuals (where the adjusted residual is equal to the internally studentised 
residual for observations within the clean sub-set and to the scaled prediction error for all other 
observations) and a new clean sub-set formed from the first M+1 observations (or the first s 
observations, if larger) in the ordered sequence where M is the size of the old clean sub-set.  This 
step is repeated until either the absolute size of the M+1'th adjusted residual in the ordered 
sequence is greater than the appropriate Bonferoni critical value of the t-statistic or the clean 
sub-set is equal to the full sample.  In the first case the M+1'th through n'th ordered observations 
                                                 
11  The OHS does not enable workers holding multiple jobs to be identified prior to 1997. 
12  The PSLSD does not enable employees who also work on their own account to be identified.  
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are declared outliers and deleted from the sample; in the latter there are no outliers to delete.  
Choosing a 5% significance level, we found 2.02% of outliers in the PSLSD data but no more 
than 0.55% in any OHS data set and less than 0.10% in the 1995, 1996 and 1997 OHS data sets.    
The final cleaned samples varied in size from 2228 observations in the PSLSD data to 
9728 in the 1995 OHS data.  The size of the workforce covered by our samples increased from 
2.38 million workers in 1993 to 3.25 million workers in 1995 before declining gradually back to 
2.30 million in 1999.  The racial composition of this workforce was relatively stable over the 
years, with the African share of the workforce rising from 58% in 1993 to 63% in 1999, the 
White share falling from 25% to 20% and the proportion of Coloured and Indian workers 
roughly constant at 12% and 5% respectively.  The average age of the workforce was 36 years 
throughout the period with comparatively little variation between racial groups.  This racial 
uniformity is the result both of demographic factors and of labour participation rates with high 
levels of youth unemployment, particularly amongst Africans (Standing et al., 1996).  The 
educational background of the racial groups differs markedly with over 80% of White workers 
and 60% of Indians having completed at least a secondary education in comparison to the 35% of 
Coloured workers and 25% of Africans with no more than a primary education in 1997.  Such 
racial disparities are, in part, the outcome of past apartheid educational policies such as the Bantu 
Education Act 1955, which limited the provision of schooling to native Africans.  Non-White 
educational standards were improved following the de Lange Commission 1979 and, more 
recently, the passage of the National Education Policy Act 1996.  But any resultant convergence 
in the educational attainment of workers is inevitably slow given both the low rate of turnover of 
the labour force and the perpetuation of disadvantage caused by household financial constraints 
to participation in education: more than 25% of the workers in 1995 who were in the age range 
15 to 24 and had not obtained Standard 10 reported that they wished to continue with their 
education but did not have enough money to do so.  Members of all racial groups participated in 
all occupations and sectors within the highly diversified economy.  But the relatively low levels 
of education received by African and Coloured workers was reflected in a marked over-
representation of African and Coloured workers in unskilled and semi-skilled occupational 
groups as compared to Indians and Whites who were more likely to work in white-collar 
occupations.  However, the proportion of African and Coloured employment in white-collar jobs 
has more than doubled since the end of apartheid, particularly due to a greater presence in 
                                                                                                                                                            
13  Two conditions must hold for identification.  The data matrix must have full rank (Hadi and Simonoff, 1993) and  
the model must not perfectly predict the wage outcomes.  The latter condition arises from the use of interval data on 
the dependent variable and serves to ensure a non-zero estimate of the standard deviation of the disturbance term.   
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education and other public sector activities.  More than 40% of the workforce were trade union 
members in 1995, with participation rates increasing among all groups in the post-apartheid 
period.  Finally, the raised sample statistics reveal particular regional concentrations of Indians in 
Kwazulu/Natal and of Coloureds in Western Cape, surrounding Cape Town, with far more 
uniform distributions of Whites and Africans.  These distributions strongly reflect historic 
settlement patterns and the influence of legislation, such as the Group Areas Act 1950. 
 
4.  Multilateral Decomposition of the Racial Wage Hierarchy 
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics on the hierarchical wage structure based on our 
sample data.  It shows that Whites had the highest geometric mean wage, followed by Indians, 
Coloureds and finally Africans who received the lowest geometric mean wage of any racial 
group throughout the period.  Following the transition to democratic rule, geometric mean wages 
initially rose for all groups but then stagnated throughout much of the latter half of the 1990s. 
The latter finding would seem to contradict evidence of persistent wage growth from sources 
such as the Survey of Average Monthly Earnings, but it must be remembered that the October 
Household Survey differs in terms of target population, survey design and methodology.14  
Moreover, the figures reported in Table 1 are geometric not arithmetic mean wages and do not 
control for changes in workforce characteristics, including occupational and sectoral 
composition.  This section provides an analysis of the evolving pattern of racial wage disparities. 
 
Table 1 : Geometric Mean Hourly Wages by Racial Group, 1993-1999. 
  Racial group 
 All races African Coloured Indian White 
 Rand/hr 
1993 8.60 5.61 7.32 11.38 23.46 
1995 10.01 7.69 7.94 12.89 22.53 
1996 9.60 7.24 8.87 13.05 22.78 
1997 9.48 6.94 9.24 13.62 23.23 
1998 9.66 6.96 10.37 13.86 22.11 
1999 10.92 8.01 10.96 14.20 26.73 
Source: Authors’ estimates from wage function regressions.   
 
                                                 
14 Posling (2002) also reports findings based on OHS data that show a lack of wage growth between 1995 and 1999. 
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 The practical implementation of the decomposition procedures requires the prior 
specification and estimation of the wage function for each racial group and for all groups 
together in each year.15  To facilitate the subsequent analysis, the log of the hourly wage was 
specified in each wage regression as a function of an identical set of explanatory variables: age,   
age squared, years of primary, secondary, diploma and university education, occupational 
category, economic sector, trade union membership and region of residence.  One potentially 
serious omission from the list of explanatory variables is a proxy for the quality of education 
received by workers due to a lack of suitable data: the OHSs provide no information on 
educational provision while that which is available from the PSLSD is seriously deficient in a 
number of respects (see Case and Deaton, 1999).  However, it should be noted that to the extent 
that the level of educational attainment is determined by educational quality (Case and Deaton, 
1999) then the estimated wage functions may be expected to capture at least some of the effects 
due to the unobserved variation in educational quality. 
Estimation of the wage functions is based on samples of full-time, regular, civilian 
employees working outwith the primary sector and therefore may be subject to sample selection 
bias.  This issue is of particular concern in the study because full-time labour absorption rates 
differ both between racial groups and over the period of comparison.  And although there is no 
necessary connection between changes in labour absorption and selectivity bias (see Blau and 
Beller, 1988), the decomposition of the change in the residual term in terms of a common and 
invariant distribution of unmeasured skills is nevertheless more plausible if the estimation results 
may be taken to represent the unconditional wage (offer) functions rather than merely the 
(observed) wage functions conditional upon sample selection.  
 Mwabu and Schultz (2000), in their study of the South African labour market based on 
the PSLSD data set, have previously sought to identify the selection into full-time regular 
employment from a combination of land use rights and financial asset variables and found 
negligible sample selection bias.  However, both the PSLSD and the OHS data contain a broader 
set of variables that the labour economics literature might suggest were of relevance in the 
determination of employment status.  Thus the range of jobs for which individuals apply and 
their willingness to accept any such offers as are made, may be influenced by personal and 
household circumstances that affect their job search activities and reservation wage but not their 
                                                 
15 Availability of space prevents the presentation of these wage functions.  They can however be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
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subsequent performance in any employment that they may choose to undertake.  Moreover, 
employers may also take some personal and household circumstances of individuals into account 
in making hiring and firing decisions but not in their determination of wage schedules.  
We therefore sought to model sample selection not only as a function of individuals' age, 
education and region of residence, but also of their marital status, position within the household, 
health status, disability status, housing tenure and type, and access to farmland.  In all cases, both 
the full set of explanatory variables and the sub-set of identifying variables were jointly 
significant in the individual probit equations.  We also found the Heckman selection correction 
variables obtained from the probit equations to be significant in a number of the wage function 
regressions.  But, the resultant coefficient estimates of the wage functions were not robust due to 
severe collinearity problems caused by the inclusion of the Heckman variable: condition 
numbers of the augmented data matrices were calculated and found to be greatly in excess of the 
recommended maximum of 20 (Leung and Yu, 1996).  All the results reported here are therefore 
based on estimates of the wage functions conditional on sample selection.  
For estimation, we used a generalised Tobit estimator (StataCorp, 1997) to deal with the 
mixture of point and interval data on the dependent variable in the wage functions.  Observations 
were weighted to reflect projections of population size based on the 1991 Census in the case of 
the PSLSD and on the 1996 Census, as adjusted by a post-enumeration survey,  in the case of all 
of the OHS data sets.  Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors were calculated that allow for 
the clustering of the samples, with the EA identified as the PSU.  However we did not allow for 
the stratification of the samples as the data do not enable the explicit identification of stratum in 
all years.  This failure to take the complex sample design fully into account may be expected to 
have given rise to needlessly large estimates of the standard errors.  Nevertheless, many of the 
coefficients were individually significant at the 5% level or higher, with signs generally 
conforming to expectations.  And  the overall fit of the wage function regressions as measured by 
the χ2 statistic was highly significantly different from zero in all regressions.  
Table 2 presents the results from the multilateral decomposition analysis based on the 
estimated wage functions.  The main part of the table expresses the gross, predicted and residual 
wage gaps relative to the (common) overall geometric mean wage in each year.  Thus the typical 
African, Coloured, Indian and White worker of 1993 earned 35% less, 15% less, 32% more and 
173% more respectively than the overall geometric wage rate of R8.65 per hour paid to the 
overall average worker in that year.  These gross wage differentials can largely be explained by 
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Table 2: Multilateral Decomposition of Hourly Wage Differentials by Racial Group 
 Racial Group 
 African Coloured Indian White 
 
 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
 Percentages of overall geometric mean wage 
Gross wage differential rγ~           
 1993 -34.79#  1.50  -14.83#  4.88  32.30#  5.60  172.80# 10.96  
 1995 -23.23#  0.57  -20.71#  1.65  28.73#  3.48  125.06# 3.20  
 1996 -24.60#  1.07  -7.62*  3.56  35.97#  6.10  137.21# 6.50  
 1997 -26.79#  0.69  -2.58   1.97  43.65#  4.82  144.98# 4.95  
 1998 -27.89#  1.30  7.36   5.08  43.45#  7.21  128.88# 7.57  
 1999 -26.67#  0.87  0.37   2.82  29.94#  6.40  144.70# 1.77  
Predicted wage differential rθ
~           
 1993 -25.85#  0.76  -13.41#  3.11  23.30#  4.55  103.92# 4.64  
of which due to disparities in:- age 0.62#  0.07  -2.55#  0.29  -4.09#  0.42  0.54#  0.07  
education -12.12#  0.70  -9.65#  0.75  17.56#  1.32  48.98#  3.16  
occupation -11.91#  0.75  -10.33#  1.04  14.70#  1.28  49.48#  3.68  
industry -0.90#  0.20  -0.18   0.31  -1.53*  0.63  4.15#  1.04  
region -2.36#  0.58  7.55*  3.19  -4.40   3.78  5.49#  1.20  
trade union membership 0.82#  0.13  1.75#  0.28  1.06#  0.17  -4.72#  0.74  
 1995 -13.41#  0.36  -19.51#  1.15  11.06#  1.69  64.92#  1.47  
 1996 -16.37#  0.60  -8.32#  2.01  19.86#  3.88  77.92#  2.95  
 1997 -16.72#  0.38  -5.74#  1.43  26.88#  2.32  72.76#  2.01  
 1998 -19.42#  0.74  3.67   3.00  24.03#  3.94  74.49#  3.07  
 1999 -17.02#  0.45  -1.80   1.71  12.14#  2.74  75.00#  2.50  
of which due to disparities in:- age 1.36#  0.12  -4.34#  0.32  -0.46#  0.06  -2.42#  0.25  
education -8.69#  0.35  -7.85#  0.45  11.39#  0.74  42.54#  1.96  
occupation -5.74#  0.34  -3.01#  0.38  3.83#  0.43  27.36#  1.77  
industry -0.71#  0.14  -2.39#  0.36  1.73#  0.44  4.67#  0.78  
region -3.93#  0.32  16.17#  1.88  -2.14   2.50  5.02#  0.73  
trade union membership 0.69#  0.10  -0.38#  0.05  -2.22#  0.31  -2.18#  0.30  
Adjusted residual wage differential )1~(~ +rr θδ         
 1993 -8.94#  1.10  -1.42   3.83  9.00   6.57  68.88#  8.51  
 1995 -9.82#  0.51  -1.20   1.38  17.67#  3.46  60.14#  3.12  
 1996 -8.23#  0.72  0.70   2.63  16.11*  6.94  59.30#  5.95  
 1997 -10.07#  0.55  3.16   1.76  16.78#  4.81  72.22#  4.73  
 1998 -8.48#  1.01  3.69   3.84  19.42*  7.60  54.39#  6.69  
 1999 -9.65#  0.75  2.16   2.45  17.81#  6.12  69.70#  5.98  
 Percentage of group-specific geometric mean non-discriminatory wage 
Unadjusted residual wage differential rδ
~
         
 1993 -12.06#  1.51  -1.64   4.42  7.30   5.48  33.78#  4.25  
 1995 -11.34#  0.58  -1.50   1.71  15.91#  3.18  36.46#  1.98  
 1996 -9.84#  0.88  0.76   2.87  13.44*  6.01  33.33#  3.38  
 1997 -12.09#  0.66  3.35   1.88  13.22#  3.85  41.81#  2.78  
 1998 -10.52#  1.26  3.56   3.71  15.66*  6.32  31.17#  3.89  
 1999 -11.63#  0.90  2.20   2.50  15.88#  5.53  39.83#  3.73  
Notes:   Approximate standard errors are computed by linearization of the relevant statistic around the estimated 
wage function parameter values.  # Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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the specified differences between the various racial groups, especially in their levels of 
educational and occupational attainment which account for the bulk of the predicted wage gaps 
of all four races.16  Taking all observed characteristics into account, the typical African, 
Coloured, Indian and White worker of 1993 would have earned 26% less, 13% less, 23% more 
and 104% more respectively than the typical worker under the hypothetical, non-discriminatory 
wage structure in that year.  The remainder of the gross wage differentials are then accounted for 
by the adjusted residual wage differentials which allow both for wage discrimination and for 
disparities in unobserved characteristics.   
Changes over time in the pattern of the gross wage differentials point to two distinct 
sub-periods in the evolution of the wage hierarchy.  The first sub-period between 1993 and 1995 
is marked by significant compression of the overall wage hierarchy together with a slight degree 
of polarisation between the wage rates of Africans and Coloureds on the one hand and those of 
Indians and Whites on the other. The most noticeable result is a fall in the African-White wage 
gap from 208% to 148% of the overall geometric mean wage which is due to both the 
improvement in the relative position of Africans and the deterioration in that of Whites.  In 
addition, the Coloured-Indian wage gap rose slightly from 47% to 49% of the overall geometric 
mean wage while both the African-Coloured and Indian-White wage gaps fell significantly.  The 
subsequent sub-period from 1995 through 1999 shows some reversal in these trends.  In 
particular, there is a partial reversal of the reduction in the African-White wage gap and the gross 
wage gap of Coloureds falls to such an extent that the typical Coloured worker no longer 
receives less than the overall geometric mean wage by 1999. Thus the transition to democratic 
rule in 1994 was accompanied by an improvement in the wage position of the majority African 
workforce relative to all other racial groups, but these gains were not fully preserved through the 
latter half of the decade. 
 Tables 3 and 4 present the results from the decomposition of the changes in the racial 
wage differentials over time.  Note that all of the changes are measured relative to a common 
base year t of 1993 and thus may be interpreted loosely as cumulative changes to date since the 
end of the apartheid regime.  Table 3 shows that the changes in the wage hierarchy have been 
largely due to movements in predicted wage differentials rather than in adjusted residual wage 
differentials which show no significant change over the period.  In particular, there are 
                                                 
16As .....])()(61)(211[)(~ **** +−−+−+−≈ ∑ ∑∑∑ kkkrj k jjjrj jjjrii iirr XXXXXXXX ββββθ , the contribution of a 
single characteristic i to rθ
~  may be approximated as 
rj jjjriiir
XXXX θββ ~])(/)[( ** ∑ −−   
 20
Table 3: Decomposition of changes in wage differentials since 1993 
 Racial Group 
 African Coloured Indian White 
Base year 1993 Coeff. Std.  Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
 Change in percentages of overall geometric mean wage 
Change in gross wage differential rγ~ by:-        
 1995 11.57#  1.60  -5.88   5.15  -3.58   6.59  -47.74#  11.42  
 1996 10.19#  1.84  7.22   6.04  3.66   8.28  -35.59#  12.74  
 1997 8.00#  1.65  12.26*  5.26  11.35   7.39  -27.82*  12.03  
 1998 6.90#  1.98  22.19#  7.05  11.14   9.13  -43.92#  13.32  
 1999 8.13#  1.73  15.20#  5.64  -2.36   8.51  -28.10*  11.10  
Change in predicted wage differential rθ
~ by:-        
  1995 12.44#  0.84  -6.10   3.31  -12.24*  4.85  -39.00#  4.86  
 1996 9.48#  0.97  5.10   3.71  -3.44   5.98  -26.01#  5.49  
 1997 9.13#  0.85  7.68*  3.42  3.57   5.11  -31.17#  5.05  
 1998 6.44#  1.06  17.08#  4.32  0.73   6.02  -29.43#  5.56  
 1999 8.83#  0.88  11.62#  3.55  -11.17*  5.31  -28.93#  5.27  
     due to changes in:-         
              observed  1995 9.05#  0.17  -0.60#  0.15  -9.36#  0.40  -27.05#  1.46  
              characteristics  1996 6.78#  0.15  6.59#  0.25  3.20#  0.37  -11.45#  1.27  
 1997 6.33#  0.21  6.05#  0.22  7.79#  0.72  -11.20#  2.06  
 1998 4.80#  0.18  9.44#  0.34  8.16#  0.65  -12.26#  1.53  
 1999 7.58#  0.15  4.45#  0.19  -9.37#  0.39  -12.52#  1.34  
of which due to changes in:- age 0.53#  0.08  -0.68#  0.16  3.58#  0.33  -2.96#  0.32  
education 3.58#  0.18  1.89#  0.18  -5.59#  0.67  -4.66#  0.79  
occupation 3.62#  0.16  5.53#  0.30  -7.91#  0.55  -7.52#  0.53  
industry -0.13   0.13  0.22   0.39  5.09#  0.63  -0.27   0.61  
region 0.10   0.13  -0.39   0.21  -1.19#  0.37  0.50   0.47  
trade union membership -0.11#  0.02  -2.12#  0.29  -3.35#  0.45  2.38#  0.31  
               returns to  1995 3.39#  0.40  -5.50#  1.25  -2.89   1.78  -11.95#  2.15  
               observed  1996 2.70#  0.63  -1.49   2.03  -6.65   4.02  -14.56#  3.53  
               characteristics  1997 2.81#  0.45  1.63   1.45  -4.22   2.66  -19.97#  3.25  
 1998 1.64*  0.77  7.64*  3.00  -7.44   4.15  -17.17#  3.75  
 1999 1.26#  0.48  7.17#  1.74  -1.80   2.81  -16.41#  3.17  
Change in adjusted residual wage differential )1
~(~ +rr θδ by:-      
  1995 -0.88   1.21  0.21   4.07  8.67   7.42  -8.74   9.07  
 1996 0.71   1.32  2.12   4.65  7.11   9.55  -9.58   10.38  
 1997 -1.13   1.23  4.58   4.21  7.78   8.14  3.35   9.74  
 1998 0.46   1.49  5.11   5.42  10.42   10.05  -14.49   10.83  
 1999 -0.71   1.33  3.58   4.54  8.81   8.98  0.83   10.40  
Notes:   Approximate standard errors are computed by linearization of the relevant statistic around the estimated wage 
function parameter values.   # Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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significant falls in both the African predicted wage deficit and the White predicted wage 
premium between 1993 and 1995, and in the Coloured wage deficit between 1995 and 1999.  
These changes in predicted wage differentials have been driven by two mutually reinforcing 
factors.  First, the absolute and relative improvement in the occupational and educational 
attainment of blacks and coloureds, which almost entirely account for the significant reductions 
in predicted wage differentials due to the effects of changes in the distribution of observed 
characteristics holding returns constant.  Overall, predicted wage differentials due to racial 
disparities in occupational attainment fell by roughly half in the cases of Africans and Whites,  
and by more than two thirds in the cases of Coloureds and Asians, between 1993 and 1999.  Falls 
in the predicted wage differentials due to racial disparities in educational attainment have been 
far less dramatic though the decomposition results do provide evidence of some convergence in 
qualifications.  Second, changes in the level of hypothetical, non-discriminatory returns over 
time have had the effect of further reducing predicted wage differentials, and particularly the 
premium paid to the typical white worker, given the racial distribution of observed 
characteristics.   
 None of the gross changes in the residual wage differentials are significantly different 
from zero.  Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 4 from the two decompositions of the 
changes in the unadjusted residual wage differentials are of some interest.  The standard 
approach (A) accounts for changes in the unadjusted residual wage differential in terms of 
changes in the returns to and levels of observed characteristics, where racial differences in 
returns may reflect the effects either of discrimination or of unobserved disparities in the quality 
of observed characteristics.  The decomposition reveals a slight but statistically significant fall in 
the degree of ‘underpayment’ faced by Africans in the post-apartheid era (together with an 
offsetting effect due to changes in the relative characteristics of the African workforce).  But the 
observed (discriminatory) returns for all races rise relative to the hypothesised returns in a non-
discriminatory labour market due to the increasing proportion of Africans in the workforce, so 
the degree of African ‘underpayment’ has not in fact fallen relative to any other racial group.  
The results of the decomposition therefore do not provide evidence of a reduction in the extent of 
either wage discrimination or racial disparities in the quality of observed characteristics.  
 The alternative decomposition (B) permits an interpretation in terms of changes in the 
returns to and levels of unobserved characteristics if residual wage differences are entirely due to 
disparities in unobserved characteristics and the overall distribution of such characteristics is 
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Table 4: Decomposition of changes in the unadjusted residual wage differential since 1993: 
(A) in terms of changes in the levels of and returns to observed characteristics  
(B) in terms of changes in the levels of and returns to unobserved characteristics 
 Racial Group 
 African Coloured Indian White 
Base year 1993 Coeff. Std.  Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
Coeff. Std.  
Error 
 Change in percentages of overall geometric mean wage 
Change in unadjusted residual wage differential rδ
~ by:-      
 1995 0.72 1.62 0.14 4.74 8.61  6.33  2.69 4.69
 1996 2.22 1.75 2.40 5.27 6.14  8.13  -0.45 5.43
 1997 -0.03 1.65 4.99 4.81 5.92  6.70  8.03 5.08
 1998 1.54 1.97 5.20 5.77 8.36  8.36  -2.61 5.76
 1999 0.43 1.76 3.84 5.08 8.58  7.78  6.06 5.65
   (A) due to changes in:-         
                     returns to  1995 3.83* 1.51 1.90 4.42 6.06  5.51  -3.46 4.83
                     observed  1996 5.37# 1.51 3.72 4.42 12.76*  5.60  1.27 4.40
                     characteristics  1997 1.81 1.51 9.70* 4.43 -0.50  5.49  8.68* 4.42
 1998 4.54# 1.51 6.41 4.43 12.61*  5.63  2.97 4.42
 1999 4.04# 1.51 7.61 4.43 30.98#  6.66  1.42 4.92
                     observed  1995 -3.11# 0.63 -1.76 1.70 2.55  2.86  6.15* 2.74
                     characteristics  1996 -3.15# 0.94 -1.32 2.82 -6.62  5.21  -1.71 2.56
 1997 -1.84* 0.73 -4.72# 1.73 6.42  3.65  -0.65 2.09
 1998 -3.00* 1.35 -1.21 3.57 -4.25  5.26  -5.58 2.91
 1999 -3.60# 0.98 -3.77 2.37 -22.40#  4.44  4.63 3.25
   (B) due to changes in:-         
                     returns to  1995 1.40  ~ 0.18  ~ -2.72   ~ -5.64  ~  
                     unobserved  1996 -0.56  ~ 0.40  ~ 1.34   ~ 2.22  ~  
                     characteristics  1997 -0.57  ~ 0.26  ~ 0.54   ~ 2.92  ~  
 1998 -0.45  ~ 0.21  ~ 1.23   ~ 2.14  ~  
 1999 -0.86  ~ 0.38  ~ 1.84   ~ 3.88  ~  
                     unobserved  1995 -0.68  ~ -0.04  ~ 11.32   ~ 8.33  ~  
                     characteristics  1996 2.78  ~ 2.00  ~ 4.80   ~ -2.67  ~  
 1997 0.53  ~ 4.73  ~ 5.39   ~ 5.11  ~  
 1998 1.99  ~ 4.99  ~ 7.13   ~ -4.74  ~  
 1999 1.30  ~ 3.46  ~ 6.74   ~ 2.18  ~  
Notes:   Approximate standard errors are computed by linearization of the relevant statistic around the estimated wage 
function parameter values.  # Significant at the 1% level.  * Significant at the 5% level.   ~ Not computed. 
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constant over time. 17  The results of the decomposition are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the persistence of residual wage differences in the post-apartheid era is due in part to a general 
increase in the dispersion of wages.  In particular, the relative wage position of Africans, who 
were concentrated at the bottom of the residual wage distribution, deteriorated between 1995 and  
1999 due to an increase in returns to unobserved characteristics (though this effect is more than 
offset by an improvement in those characteristics).  Nonetheless, the absolute sizes of the effects 
attributed to changes in the returns to unobserved characteristics are so small as to suggest that 
broader changes in the overall distribution of wages were not an important cause of the 
persistence of residual wage differences. 
Overall, the changes in racial wage differences have the somewhat unexpected 
consequence that the extent to which the racial wage hierarchy can be explained on the basis of 
racial disparities in observed characteristics has fallen, not risen, following the end of the 
apartheid regime.  The final part of Table 2 reports the amount by which a racial group was 
underpaid/overpaid relative to the wage it would have received in the hypothesised non-
discriminatory labour market.  Thus in 1999 the wages of a typical African, Coloured, Indian and 
White worker were respectively 12% lower, 2% higher, 16% higher and 40% higher than they 
would have been in the absence of both unobserved racial disparities in characteristics and wage 
discrimination. 
 
5.  Discussion  
A central theme of this paper is the way that the racial wage hierarchy evolved in South Africa 
over the period 1993 to 1999 amongst full-time regular employees of normal working age, but 
excluding those in the primary sector and the defence forces.  We find that the transition to 
democratic rule in 1994 was accompanied by an improvement in the wage position of the 
majority African workforce relative to all other racial groups, but that these gains were not fully 
                                                 
17 We sought to explain the variation in the residuals from the pooled regression for each year as a linear function of 
educational quality where, following Case and Deaton (1999), we used data from the Educational Atlas of South 
Africa (Krige et al., 1994) to calculate the logarithm of the pupil-teacher ratio by district and race in 1991 as a proxy 
for educational quality.  The explanatory variable was found to be significant in regressions using the pooled 
sample for each year, which is not particularly surprising given the marked racial disparities in average class sizes 
in 1991, but not in any of the separate regressions run using the individual racial sub-samples.  These results should 
not be taken as a rejection of the hypothesis that the quality of education has a bearing on wages, but rather as a 
reflection of the inadequacies of the proxy variable.  In particular, the pupil-teacher ratio for a district in 1991 can 
not be reliably linked to workers currently residing in that district given migration between districts and changes in 
educational provision over time.  Moreover, to the extent that educational attainment may serve as a proxy for 
educational quality then the effects of educational quality may already be purged from the residuals.  
 24
preserved through the latter half of the decade.  The persistence of racial wage differences 
following the repeal of all overt discriminatory laws and regulations points to the need for 
concerted policy interventions to reverse the legacy of apartheid.  However, it is important to 
identify the various sources of this labour market inequality in order to devise appropriate 
remedial programmes and to monitor their impact on labour market outcomes.  
Our multilateral decomposition analysis indicates that the racial wage hierarchy at the 
end of the apartheid era can largely be explained by observed differences between racial groups, 
especially in educational and occupational attainment.  Since then, the entire education system 
has been systematically reformed through the passage of the South African Schools Act 1996, the 
Further Education and Training Act 1998 and the Higher Education Act 1997.  Schooling has 
been made compulsory for all children aged seven to fourteen and funding increased 
significantly with government expenditure on education rising from R31.8 billion in 1994 to 
R51.1 billion in 2000 (Department of Education, 2001).  Our (unreported) wage regressions 
exhibit positive returns to post-primary education for all races (see also Moll, 1996; Allanson et 
al., 2000; Mwabu and Schultz, 2000), providing non-Whites with the incentives to take 
advantage of the new opportunities.  Nevertheless, household finances may constrain 
participation in education, frustrating attempts to further reduce predicted wage differentials in 
the absence of significant income and wealth redistribution.   
New employment legislation has also been introduced within the general framework 
established by the Labour Relations Act 1995.  In particular, the Employment Equity Act 1998 
requires employers to implement affirmative action measures, including preferential treatment 
and racial employment targets, to ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified non-
Whites in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce.  However the experience of 
the USA in a similar situation suggests that some forms of discrimination can be extremely 
persistent and difficult to counter by legislation.  In particular, the racial segregation of housing 
in South Africa may maintain labour market segregation through recruitment via local networks 
and help to sustain employers' beliefs in racial differences (Arrow, 1998). Standing et al. (1996) 
provides evidence of informal screening devices adopted in the South African labour market. 
The remainder of the racial wage differentials observed in 1993 is due to the combined 
effects of wage discrimination and unobserved differences between racial groups.  
Discrimination in remuneration was made illegal by, inter alia, the Labour Relations Act 1995 
which gave effect to the Constitutional right to fair labour practices.  Employees were further 
given the right by the Employment Equity Bill 1998 to institute proceedings through the 
 25
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration for alleged discrimination, with the 
burden of proof falling on the employer (Barker, 1999).  These various labour market measures 
provide powerful instruments to counter the discriminatory practices that have sustained the 
overpayment of Whites and the underpayment of other races.  
 Residual wage differentials may also be reduced by the fundamental reform of the 
education system to the extent that this serves to decrease the unobserved differences between 
racial groups.  In particular, the more equitable distribution of educational funding has had the 
effect of reducing historical inequities in learning conditions though considerable variation still 
exists within the public schooling system (Department of Education, 2001).  In addition, reform 
of the curriculum, which is envisaged in the 'Curriculum 2005' initiative (Department of 
Education, 2001), has considerable potential to improve the productivity of non-Whites (Moll, 
1998).  However these changes will have only a gradual impact on the racial wage hierarchy as 
newly-qualified entrants are absorbed into the labour market.  
The multilateral decomposition analysis provides some of the first, detailed evidence 
about the evolution of the wage hierarchy in the post-apartheid era.  We find that the predicted 
wage differentials have fallen somewhat, due in part to the greater representation of African and 
Coloured workers in White-collar jobs in the public sector and a narrowing of the gaps in 
educational attainment.  But the relative improvement in the measured characteristics of the 
African workforce at the time of the transition to democratic rule has not been sustained in the 
post-apartheid era.  The residual wage differentials have not declined and are virtually constant 
throughout the entire period.  We show that the increasing inequality in the overall distribution 
of wages has had only a negligible effect on racial wage differentials.   
 These findings suggest that the policy reforms of the post-apartheid era have yet to have 
had a significant effect on the racial wage hierarchy in the secondary and tertiary sectors.  
However, it is too early to judge the effectiveness of these reforms given their timing and the 
endemic nature of the problems that they are designed to tackle.  Only time will tell whether 
they are sufficient to eliminate the disadvantages and discrimination faced by non-Whites in the 
labour market as a legacy of apartheid or whether further policy interventions will be needed to 
achieve this goal. 
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